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Restructuring the Security Council

Toby D.J. Mendel*
The Charter of the United Nationsl was designed during the
latter part of World War II and came into force in 1945. Since then,
changes have occurred which have dramatically altered the nature of
international relations. These changes include the demise of colonialism, the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with important
repercussions for other nations espousing a socialist ideology, and the
rise or fall in international prominence of many nations. These changes
in the international balance of power and division of political affiliation
must be accompanied by practical and structural changes at the United
Nations. The current political organization of the United Nations is no
longer capable of effectively and equitably regulating international
relations.
The core political entity at the United Nations is the Security
Council. The Security Council is comprised of five permanent membersthe Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(until its demise in 1991), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America2- and ten nonpermanent members elected from the General Assembly for a term of
two years. A great deal of power is vested in the Security Council, with
special powers accorded to the permanent members. There may well be
a need for a small executive group within the United Nations to
effectively carry out its mandate. It is less clear, however, that the five
states listed above should have permanent membership in this elite club.
The arrangement of the Security Council immediately brings two questions to mind. The first is whether the current composition of the
Security Council reflects modern international power broking reality?
The second is whether there should be any members who sit permanently on such an important body?

Powers of the Security Council
Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations grants the
Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security." Chapter VI of the Charter mandates certain
powers with respect to pacific settlement of any dispute including the
power to call upon the parties to settle,3 investigate,4 and recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 5 Chapter VII deals
with the powers of the Security Council in the face of a threat to the
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Article 41 allows the
Security Council to impose economic, political, and communication
blockades that are binding on the rest of the General Assembly. Article
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42 allows for such military action as is necessary in light of a failure to
solve the problem using measures mandated under Article 41. Finally,
Article 12 requires the General Assembly not to make any recommendation with respect to any matter being dealt with by the Security
Council.6
The powers of the Security Council cannot be underestimated.
They are analogous to the enforcement powers of the police in most
states. The Security Council has the added advantage ofbeing both selfregulating and immune from external disciplinary interference. The
conflagration in Iraq, in 1991, indicates how pervasive these powers can
be. The standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union has,
until recently, substantially prevented the exercise of these powers; it
seems unlikely, however, that international politics will, in future,
interfere unduly with the extensive powers granted to the Security
Council.
Article 27 gives each member of the Security Council one vote
and provides that decisions on procedural matters be made by an
affirmative vote of at least nine members. All other matters, however,
must be affirmed by at least nine members, including the concurring
votes of the permanent members.7 This power is commonly referred to
as the right of veto and allows any one of the five permanent members
to paralyse any non-procedural proposal. Article 109 gives the permanent members a similar sort of veto over amendments to the Charter
itself.8
This political organization thus concentrates power in the Security Council and then gives five of the 160 members extraordinary veto
powers. At face value these powers would seem to operate only negatively, that is, only in a way that would prevent action being taken. In
practice, however, the ability to stymie any action also carries enormous
negotiating power which may effectively be used to advance policies
advocated by a permanent member. The arrangement at the Security
Council thus increases the power of the permanent members in respect
to decisions and strategies of all the United Nations bodies.

Are the Right Nations Permanent Members?
'"c.

It is hard to justify the current permanent membership of the
United Nations Security Council no matter which criteria are used:
gross national product or other economic indicators; population; military prowess; geography, either in terms of size or regional distribution;
and/or general international influence. France and the United Kingdom
are obvious candidates for exclusion. Japan, Germany, and India have
among the most compelling reasons for inclusion. The fate of the Soviet
Union's seat is not clear. As of this writing, Russia was 'volunteering' to
take over the Soviet Union's role, but it seems clear that they have no
right to unilaterally take over a position which members of the United
Nations gave to another, quite different, political entity. It seems,
however, that some of the remaining permanent members have accepted
this arrangement, at least in principle.
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France and the United Kingdom may claim that their colonial
influence, still extant despite the demise of colonialism itself, justifies
their permanent position since international influence is the main
criterion. This argument is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that
both the Francophonie and the Commonwealth grew out of the influence
of the colonizing states should not guarantee those states a disproportionate amount of power. Both organizations are run along democratic
lines and no longer reflect the inequality present in their genesis.
Secondly, such influence is geographically confined and, hence, not an
acceptable consideration at the United Nations. Any natural influence
deriving from a colonial past should be wielded through post-colonial
institutions and not through the United Nations.
Are Permanent Members Necessary?

Can such a fundamentally undemocratic system be defended?
There are those who would argue that international law is no more than
an institutionalized law of the jungle and thus it is appropriate that the
more powerful have disproportionate representation. If this were
strictly true, there would be no need for the United Nations and many
current members would never have joined an organization based on such
an ideology. A more fundamental criticism of this philosophy is that it
runs counter to the whole basis of the Charter which is founded in
concepts such as equality of nations, respect for national sovereignty,
cooperation, peace, and self-determination.9
Another defence of the status quo at the United Nations is that
while democratic institutions are theoretically desirable and a worthwhile goal, the current reality of international relations and the status
of international law preclude a fully democratic international mechanism. This argument posits that the present structure of the United
Nations is the best, or at least an acceptable, compromise between the
competing forces of democracy and the reality of powerful international
interests.
Modern democracies all entail a trade-off between a notionally
equal input by all members and the need to function practically. Thus,
in Canada, we delegate an impressive array of governing powers to
bodies elected once every four or five years. While in power, those elected
have far more political power than ordinary citizens, but we accept this
as a practical system for running a democracy. Such compromises,
however, must be tailored carefully to institutional realities, allow for
reasonable group representation, and be subject to controls to prevent
abuse. All of these safeguards are lacking with respect to the permanent
members of the Security Council.
The Charter of the United Nations reflects international concerns in the aftermath of the Second World War. At best, it represents
an outlook which, though current at that time, is no longer acceptable.
Colonialism was still very much in force. There was a tension between
the capitalist and communist blocs and the Allies were intent on
developing an international institution capable of preventing the rav-
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ages the world had just experienced. At worst, the Charter could be
dismissed as being a product primarily of European and North American
thinking. In 1945, very few African states were independent, most of
Asia was either under colonial administration or politically unsettled,
;md South America was largely dominated by the United States. At that
·time, only a small proportion of those developing countries which had
attained independence could allocate the level of human and other
resources necessary to adequately contribute to the process of international constitution building.
Prevention of war remains an important role of the United
Nations and delegation of power to take action on behalf of the United
Nations to the Security Council is practical. This requirement cannot
justify the concept of permanent membership on the Security Council.
The permanent members have been active in many of the wars the
United Nations should have been trying to prevent or, at least, to
mitigate. Clearly, permanent membership makes it extremely difficult
for the United Nations to take an active role in such disputes. In
addition, the pervasive influence of the permanent members often
discourages members of the General Assembly from being as critical as
they might otherwise be, thus reducing attempts to discourage acts of
violence through channels normally available to the General Assembly.
There is simply no mechanism to prevent abuse of power by permanent
members in a conflict of interest situation.
One might argue, as a practical matter, that non-members
would be reluctant to participate in Security Council mandated activities to prevent aggression. It is, therefore, necessary to preserve
permanent membership of the most powerful nations to ensure their
participation in such activities. The one true example of Security
Council cooperation in this area, the military operation against Iraq in
1991, exposes the fallacy of this argument: many nations neither within
the area directly affected by the conflict nor on the Security Council were
represented militarily and it is hard to imagine that mere exclusion from
the Security Council would have deterred American enthusiasm.
Permanent membership on the Security Council runs contrary
to one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, the idea of
equality.10 In practice, those states with greater resources will tend to
wield a disproportionate amount of power irrespective of the formal
structure used. To formally accord them this power, however, seriously
undermines the goal of equality and no longer serves the objectives for
which the power was originally granted. The potential for abuse of the
veto power and its use to further goals other than those for which it was
intended have been discussed with respect to acts of aggression above.
It would be very difficult to institute controls to prevent misuse of these
powers. The ability of permanent members to influence even nonSecurity Council affairs through their extraordinary power further
erodes the principle of equality of members of the United Nations.
The most important reason to abolish permanent members of
the Security Council is the profound structural change in international
relations that has occurred since the Charter was signed. On one hand,
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the tension between the communist bloc and the Western European
nations no longer exists. On the other hand, the end of colonialism has
brought about a rise in prominence ofless developed countries. This has
shifted the focus in international relations from an East-West bias to a
North-South one. Unfortunately, the composition of the Security Council does not reflect these changes. For example, the developed countries
represent approximately twenty per cent of the world's population but
occupy eifhty per cent of the permanent positions on the Security
Council.I
Developing nations have often found themselves caught between two superpowers hungry to increase their international influence.
While this was not a fortunate position for less wealthy nations to be in,
the tension between competing superpowers helped prevent some of the
worst abuses. Many developing countries are now worried that, without
hindrance from the defunct communist bloc, the United States will be
able to pursue its international goals to the detriment of their sovereignty and self-determination. Using its position on the Security Council
and its economic and military clout, the United States is now able to
'promote' its values and ideas with less international opposition than
ever before. Very few states supported the actions ofiraq in the summer
of 1990, but many developing countries were apprehensive of the ease
with which the United States was able to achieve its objectives at the
Security Council. It is essential that developing nations, who now
seriously lack adequate representation on the Security Council, be given
a greater say.

Conclusion
Several profound changes in the international scenario since the
signing of the Charter militate in favour of abolishing the tremendous
concentration of power represented by permanent membership in the
Security Council. These changes include the demise of colonialism; the
break-up of the Soviet Union and its political, economic and military
bloc; and changes in international influence of United Nation member
states. Reasons which may have supported permanent Security Council
membership in 1945 no longer exist today. Given the commitment of the
United Nations to egalitarianism and the lack of a compelling reason to
continue an otherwise outdated system, permanent membership in the
Security Council should be abolished. If permanent membership is to be
retained, it should be brought into line with modern reality. Actual
should replace historical international influence as one of the criteria.
In light of the shift in international focus from an East-West to
a North-South bias, it may be appropriate to allocate veto powers to
regional
Regional affiliations are growing ever stronger
and the recent proliferation of states makes regional representation
even more practical. Representatives with a veto power could be elected
for a certain period of time by regional member states. The concentration
of power represented by a veto could be moderated by being subject_to one
of several control mechanisms. One possiblilty could be a democratic
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right to remove the veto holder exercisable by the whole United Nations,
the Security Council and/or the rest of the representatives from the
region in question. This would prevent the state temporarily holding the
veto from abusing its extraordinary rights. Such a system would prevent
powerful nations or groups of nations from exerting disproportionate
influence and guarantee that the Security Council truly represented the
whole world. This would represent a significant step toward making the
United Nations the egalitarian body it purports to be.
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